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ABSTRACT. We estimate underlying macroeconomic policy objectives of three of the earliest explicit
inﬂation targeters – Australia, Canada and New Zealand – within the context of a small open
economy DSGE model. We assume central banks set policy optimally, such that we can reverse
engineer policy objectives from observed time series data. We ﬁnd that none of the central banks
show a concern for stabilizing the real exchange rate. All three central banks share a concern for
minimizing the volatility in the change in the nominal interest rate. The Reserve Bank of Australia
places the most weight on minimizing the deviation of output from trend. Joint tests of the posterior
distributions of these policy preference parameters suggest that the central banks are very similar
in their overall objective.
KEYWORDS: Small open economies, central bank objectives, Bayesian time series analysis.
J.E.L. CODE: C51, E52, F41
1. INTRODUCTION
S
URPRISINGLY OFTEN, in the context of monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models, central bank behavior is described as a reduced-form monetary policy rule.
One reason may be that such ad hoc and reduced-form policy rules do provide good empirical ﬁt.
For example, the Taylor rule has provided a remarkably useful description of US monetary policy
behavior after the Volcker disinﬂation. However, such reduced-form descriptions are not generally
helpful when one wishes to understanding central banks preferences, or what they trying to achieve
with macroeconomic stabilization. That requires specifying and comparing speciﬁc macroeconomic
policy objectives since reduced-form policy rules are functions of both underlying macroeconomic
policy objectives and other key structural (private agents’ taste and technology) parameters.
In this paper, we seek to identify the macroeconomic objectives of three of the earliest explicit
inﬂation targeters – Australia, Canada and New Zealand, over the period 1990Q1 - 2005Q3. We
treat the central bank as an optimizing agent, thus placing the central bank on the same footing as
the other optimizing agents in the economy. We assume that monetary policy is set optimally and
in a time-consistent fashion because no precommitment device is available (see Bernanke, Laubach,
Mishkin, and Posen, 1999, pp.5-6). We estimate the same DSGE model for each country and reverse
engineer stabilization objectives that are conditioned on the structure of each economy.
We ﬁnd that none of the central banks show a concern for stabilizing the real exchange rate.
All three central banks share a concern for minimizing the volatility in the change in the nominal
interest rate. The Reserve Bank of Australia places the most weight on minimizing the deviation of
output from trend. In contrast to existing applications of Bayesian econometrics to the evaluation of
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DSGE models, we also attempt to compare the posterior distributions of the central banks’ preference
parameters. Joint tests of the posterior distributions of these policy preference parameters suggest
that the central banks are very similar in their overall objective.
Our results should help inform monetary policy experiments that seek optimal policy rules for open
economy inﬂation targeters. A wealth of policy experiments seek optimal policy for speciﬁc loss
function parameterizations (see for example Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999, Levin and Williams,
2003, Levin and Williams, 2003 and Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2005, amongst others). However,
typical loss function parameterizations may be inconsistent with the data (see Dennis, 2006). Den-
nis (2006) points out that policy rules optimized on typical loss function parameterizations yield
particularly aggressive policy rules that are inconsistent with observed smoothing of interest rates
(see Lowe and Ellis, 1997). We contribute to this debate by explicitly identifying the loss function
parameters for open economy inﬂation targeters conditioned on a microfounded DSGE model.
Furthermore, estimates of macroeconomic policy objectives can potentially enhance both the
transparency and accountability of the practical implementation of monetary policy. Most inﬂation
targeting central banks describe themselves as “ﬂexible” in their approach to inﬂation targeting,
implying central banks objectives embody factors beyond simply inﬂation. However, while central
banks are often explicit about the macroeconomic variables they are concerned with, the trade-offs
across these macroeconomic objectives are never elucidated. We believe transparency is enhanced by
providing explicit statements of how alternative stabilization objectives are weighted (see Svensson,
2005).
Finally, historical estimates of stabilization objectives (conditioned on an explicit structural and
microfounded model) provide a framework for central bank boards or government agencies tasked
with assessing central bank performance. For example, clause 4(b) of New Zealand’s 2002 Policy
Targets Agreement (PTA), the agreement between the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
and the Minster of Finance, states that: “In pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank shall ... seek
to avoid unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the exchange rate”. Simply observing
the unconditional volatilities of the goal variables in the PTA cannot provide an examination of
monetary policy.
Several authors report empirical estimates of the objectives of the US Federal Reserve system.
Salemi (1995) provides the earliest estimates based on a VAR model. In contrast to the mandate of
the Federal Reserve, Favero and Rovelli (2003), Castelnuovo and Surico (2004) and Dennis (2006)
ﬁnd either small or insigniﬁcant weights on output stabilization over the Volcker-Greenspan period.
In addition, Ozlale (2005) and Dennis (2006) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant weight on interest rate smoothing
in the context aggregate empirical models. Nimark (2006) provides estimates of macroeconomic
objectives for both the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Federal Reserve that suggest the
RBA puts more weight on output stabilization and interest smoothing than the US Federal Reserve.
However, Nimark’s paper is on signal extraction using the bond market and uses a closed economy
model that is silent on any preference for mitigating exchange rate volatility. Given Australia’s degree
of openness and the focus of this paper, an open economy model appears necessary to approximate
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In contrast, we estimate central bank preferences for Australia, Canada and New Zealand, jointly
within an open economy DSGE model. Furthermore, the DSGE model provides an incomplete
exchange rate pass-through channel in import prices such that deviations from the law of one price
(or alternatively real exchange rate deviations) matter for the economies. Such a model allows us to
incorporate central bank preferences over exchange rate movements, as indicated by New Zealand
PTA for example.
Our DSGE model extends Monacelli (2005) by introducing endogenous persistence on both the
aggregate demand and supply sides of the model and has similarities with Justiniano and Preston
(2005). We use Bayesian methods to estimate the model and apply an identical prior to each of the
countries in our sample. We make inference statements regarding preferences from draws from the
posterior distribution. Our Bayesian methodology closely follows related papers in the literature (see
Smets and Wouters, 2003 and Rabanal and Rubio-Ram´ ırez, 2005 for example). Although we focus on
policy objectives, the estimates from our DSGE model should also help inform a growing empirical
open economy literature (see for example Justiniano and Preston, 2005, Lubik and Schorfheide,
2005a, Lubik and Schorfheide, 2005b).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 outlines the empirical
methodology and describes the data we use. Section 4 presents our results and we make concluding
comments in section 5.
2. THE MODEL
2.1 The average household
The stylized economy is similar to the open economy model in Monacelli (2005) and Justiniano
and Preston (2005). The economy has identical households with a total population of measure 1. We
assume the functional form for period utility:
U (Ct,Ht,Nt) =
(Ct   Ht)
1  





1 +  
, (1)
where Ct is an index of consumption goods, Ht = hCt 1 is an external habit stock, with h   (0,1)
capturing the degree of habit persistence and Nt is labour hours.
Deﬁne the prices for each differentiated home and foreign good of type i   [0,1] and j   [0,1],
respectively, as PH,t (i) and PF,t (j). Let Bt+1 be the risk-free nominal value of an internationally
traded bond held at the end of period t, and WtNt be the total wage income. The stochastic discount
factor is EtQt,t+1 such that it will be inversely related to the gross return on a nominal riskless
one-period bond, EtQt,t+1 = R 1
t .
The average household solves a recursive problem:
V (Bt,Ht) = max
Ct,Nt
U (Ct,Ht,Nt) +  Et {V (Bt+1,Ht+1)};     (0,1) (2)






[PH,t (i)CH,t (i) + PF,t (j)CF,t (j)]didj + EtQt,t+1Bt+1   WtNt. (3)
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The consumption index Ct is linked to a continuum of domestic, CH,t (i), and foreign goods,
CF,t (j), which exist on the interval of [0,1] where:
Ct =
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(5)
The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is given by   > 0 and the elasticity
of substitution between goods within each goods category (home and foreign) is   > 0. Optimal





   




   
CF,t (6)
for all i,j   [0,1], where the aggregate price levels are deﬁned as
PH,t =
   1
0
PH,t (i)
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0
PF,t (j)




and optimal consumption demand of home and foreign goods can be derived, respectively, as




   




   
Ct.
Substitution of these demand functions into (4) yields the consumer price index as
Pt =
 
(1    )P
1  




1   . (8)
The intratemporal condition relating labour supply (the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure) to the real wage (the marginal product of labour) must also be satisﬁed:







Finally, intertemporal optimality for the household decision problem must satisfy
 
 
Ct+1   Ht+1
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for all dates t   N and states in t+1 reachable from the time-t state. Taking conditional expectations
yields the familiar stochastic Euler equation
 RtEt
  
Ct+1   Ht+1
Ct   Ht





2.2 International risk sharing and relative prices
The rest of the world, denoted by variables and parameters with an asterisk, solves a similar
problem to the small open economy. Speciﬁcally, the rest of the world is the limiting case of a
closed economy, where      1. First-order conditions for optimal labour supply and consumption,
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preferences and complete international markets, we obtain perfect risk sharing,
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for all dates and states, and where   et is the nominal exchange rate. We also deﬁne conventionally
the real exchange rate as
Qt =   etP 
t /Pt. (12)
Assuming ex ante identical countries, and no preference shocks to the rest of the world, this implies
that
Ct   hCt 1 =     
C 








where    = 1 imposes ex ante symmetry of countries and zero net foreign asset holdings.
Let ct := ln(Ct/Css),y 
t := ln(Y  
t /Y  
ss) = ln(C 
t /C 
ss), and qt := ln(Qt/Q 
t), denote the per-
centage deviation of home consumption, foreign output and real exchange rate from their respective
steady states, where Xss is the deterministic steady state value of a variable Xt. Then, a log-linear
approximation of (13) is
ct   hct 1 = y 
t   hy 
t 1 +
1   h
 
qt. (14)
Complete markets thus imply that global consumption will be perfectly correlated in the absence of
deviations in the real exchange rate.
From (11) we can also derive the no-arbitrage condition for exchange rates, or the uncovered
interest parity condition





which must hold for all states and dates. A log-linear approximation of this, and taking expectations
with respect to the time-t sigma algebra, yields the familiar nominal interest parity condition:
Etet+1   et = rt   r 
t (16)
where et := ln(  et/ess), and the domestic and foreign rates of return are, rt = Rt 1 and r 
t = R 
t  1,
respectively.
We can deﬁne the terms of trade as the ratio of the foreign goods price index to the home goods
price index. In log-linear terms this is
st = pF,t   pH,t. (17)
2.3 Production and optimal pricing
There exist continua of monopolistically competitive domestic producers i   [0,1] that produce
differentiated goods and import retailers j   [0,1] that add markups to goods imported at world
prices. We employ similar pricing assumptions as in Justiniano and Preston (2005) and Smets
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inﬂation indexation for non-optimizing price setters. This allows inﬂation to be partly a jump variable
and also partially backward-looking.
Domestic goods ﬁrms: Domestic goods ﬁrms operate a linear production technology, YH,t (i) =
 a,tNt (i) where  a,t is an exogenous domestic technology shock. Domestic ﬁrms face an independent
signal that allows them to set prices optimally each period with probability 1    H. In each period
t, the remaining fraction  H   (0,1) of ﬁrms partially index their price to take into account of
aggregate domestic inﬂation according to the simple rule






where  H   [0,1] measures the degree of inﬂation indexation. Since all ﬁrms either receive the same
signal to reset prices or do not receive any signal, they will choose the same pricing strategies. Given
Calvo price setting it is straightforward to deﬁne the dynamics of the aggregate price level of the
domestic goods. In particular, deﬁne the evolution of the aggregate home goods price index as
PH,t =
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(19)
Consider a candidate ﬁrm i that had set its price optimally in time t as PH,t (i). Suppose at some
time t+s, s   0, the price PH,t (i) still prevails. Then the ﬁrm will have to face the demand for its









   
 




Note that market demand at time t+s will take into account the inﬂation indexation between t and
t + s.
Firms that set optimal prices do so to maximize their present value of the stochastic stream of
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Note that we also allow for a structural shock to real marginal cost given by  H,t   i.i.d.(0, H).
This has the interpretation of an independent cost-push shock to domestic goods producers.
The ﬁrst order necessary condition characterizing domestic ﬁrms’ optimal pricing function in a
symmetric equilibrium is
Et
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Let the home goods inﬂation rate be  H,t := ln(PH,t/PH,t 1) and yt := ln(Yt/Yss) be the
percentage deviation of home output from steady state. Denote the real marginal cost in percentage
deviation terms from its deterministic steady-state mcH,ss = [ /(    1)]
 1 as mcH,t. In appendix
A we derive the log-linear approximation of the optimal pricing decision rule, which can easily be
expressed as the following Phillips curve for domestic goods inﬂation:
 H,t    H H,t 1 =   (Et H,t+1    H H,t) +  H (mcH,t +  H,t) (24)
where  H = (1     H)(1    H)  1
H and
mcH,t =  yt   (1 +  ) a,t +  st +
 
1   h
 
y 
t   hy 
t 1
 
+ qt +  c,t. (25)
Import retail ﬁrms: Import retailers are assumed to purchase imported goods at competitive world
prices. However, these ﬁrms act as monopolistically competitively re-distributors of these goods. This
creates a gap between the price of imported goods in domestic currency terms and the domestic retail
price of imported goods. Deﬁne this law of one price (LOP) gap in log-linear terms as:
 F,t = et + p 
t   pF,t. (26)
The pricing behavior for imports retailers is similar to that of domestic goods producers. In short,
the evolution of the imports price index is given by
PF,t =
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1  
(27)










   
CF,t+s. (28)
Note that market demand at time t+s will take into account the inﬂation indexation between t and


















subject to (28) for t,s = 0,1,.... Here we also allow for a structural shock to marginal cost (world
price of good j) given by  F,t   i.i.d.(0, F). This has the interpretation of an independent cost-push
shock to imports retailers.
The ﬁrst order necessary condition characterizing the import retailers’ optimal pricing function in
the symmetric equilibrium is
Et
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Let  F,t := ln(PF,t/PF,t 1). Log-linearizing this around the non-stochastic steady state (see appendix8 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
A) yields
 F,t =  Et ( F,t+1    F F,t) +  F F,t 1 +  F ( F,t +  F,t), (31)
where  F = (1     F)(1    F)  1
F .
2.4 Terms of trade, real exchange rate and market clearing
We can derive a relationship between the terms of trade, the real exchange rate and the LOP gap.
Speciﬁcally, log-linearizing the real exchange rate deﬁnition (12) around the deterministic steady
state we have
qt = et + p 
t   pt. (32)
From (26) we can re-write this as
qt =  F,t + pF,t   pt    F,t   (1    )(pF,t   pH,t) =  F,t   (1    )st. (33)
where the last term is obtained by log-linearizing the CPI deﬁnition and then using (17).
The remaining market-clearing condition to consider is in the product markets. In the rest of the
world we have the limit of a closed economy so that y 
t = c 
t for all t. In the small open economy,
this requires that domestic output equals total domestic and foreign demand for home produced
goods. In log-linear terms this is
yt = cH,t + c 
H,t.
Since the demand for home and foreign consumption goods can be written in log-linear form as
cH,t = (1    )[  st + ct] and c 
H,t =  [  (st +  F,t) + y 
t], respectively, we can write
yt = (2    )  st + (1    )ct +    F,t +  y 
t. (34)
2.5 Log-linear approximation of the model
In this section we summarize the log-linearized equilibrium conditions. The consumption Euler
equation is obtained by log-linearizing (10) and taking expectations conditional on the time-t sigma
algebra:
ct   hct 1 = Et (ct+1   hct)  
1   h
 
(rt   Et t+1). (35)
Domestic goods inﬂation is given by (24) and substituting out the term mcH,t:
 H,t =  Et ( H,t+1    H H,t) +  H H,t 1
+  H
 
 yt   (1 +  ) a,t +  st +
 
1   h
(ct   hct 1)
 
+  H H,t (36)
Imports inﬂation is given by (31) and substituting out the term  F,t with (33):
 F,t =  Et ( F,t+1    F F,t) +  F F,t 1 +  F [qt   (1    )st] +  F F,t (37)KAM, LEES & LIU: HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS 9
Leading (32) one period, ﬁrst-differencing, taking the time-t conditional expectations operator, and
then combining with (38) yields the real interest parity condition,
Et (qt+1   qt) = (rt   Et t+1)  
 
r 
t   Et  
t+1
 
+  q,t. (38)
First differencing the terms of trade equation (17) we have
st   st 1 =  F,t    H,t +  s,t. (39)
Goods market clearing (34) in combination with (26) yields
yt = (1    )ct +   qt +   st +  y 
t (40)
First-differencing the CPI deﬁnition yields CPI inﬂation,
 t = (1    ) H,t +   F,t (41)
Exogenous stochastic processes for terms-of-trade, technology and real-interest-parity shocks:






for j = s,a,q. Recall the marginal cost shocks in the home goods and import retailers proﬁt functions
are  H   i.i.d.(0, H) and  F   i.i.d.(0, F), respectively.
Finally, for simplicity we assume that the foreign processes {  ,y ,r } are given by uncorrelated
AR(1) processes:1
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 , (43)
where (   ,t, y ,t, r ,t)   N(0,I3).
2.6 Central bank preferences
Since the model possesses incomplete exchange rate pass through in the short run (which gives
rise to persistent gaps in the law of one price for imported goods) there is a potential role for the
central bank to minimize these gaps. Alternatively, given the terms of trade st from equation (33),
the central bank can target the real exchange rate qt to stabilize these law of one price gaps,  F,t.
For computational and estimation purposes, we suppose the one-period general loss function for the
central bank is quadratic:2




   2 + µyy2
t + µqq2




1Our earlier estimates have also utilized assumptions on { 
 ,y
 ,r
 } as being generated by a VAR(1) process and also
a limiting closed-economy New-Keynesian model under a ﬁrst best ﬁscal-monetary policy arrangement. The former is
statistically more ﬂexible than our current assumption, and the latter is a stricter theoretical restriction on the data. We
found that these assumptions do not matter very much. Thus, a reasonable middle ground for statistical ﬂexibility and
parsimony in our model parameterization would be to use our current assumption.
2Our aim is recover the macroeconomic objectives of open economy central banks. We take no stance on normative
design aspects of what these objectives should be. Rather, we simply seek what our three open economy inﬂation targeters
have tried to achieve over the sample period.10 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
where    rt := rt rt 1+ r,t represents the targeted change in actual short-term interest rate (e.g. some
measured 90-day rate) which cannot be perfectly controlled. The random variable  r,t   i.i.d.(0, 2
r)
represents imperfect central-bank control of the short-term interest rate.3 The parameters µy,µq,µr  
[0,+ ) express the concern with output stabilization, real exchange rate stabilization and targeted
interest rate smoothing respectively. These objectives are expressed relative to a concern for annual
inﬂation (   t :=
 3
i=0  t i/4) that is normalized to one. This speciﬁcation of macroeconomic
objectives captures the expressed goals of so-called “ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting central banks.
From a public ﬁnance perspective, such assignments of policy objective functions are clearly ad
hoc. For example, the literature following the method of deriving an approximate private-welfare-
based loss function in Woodford (2003) would argue that the loss function parameters are not “free”
but must be constrained by the preferences of the representative household. However, in defence of
our approach we make three arguments.
First, it may be impossible to map a second-order approximation of the welfare maximizing
central-bank loss function from household preferences (see Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2005 and Monacelli,
2005).4 Second, from an empirical perspective our loss function captures the goal variables Australia,
Canada and New Zealand have deﬁned as monetary policy objectives. In the case of New Zealand,
there is a legislated set of policy objectives: price stability, output, interest rates and the exchange
rate. Finally, our formulation of objectives nests the monetary policy literature that seeks to evaluate
the efﬁcacy of alternative monetary policy rules using quadratic loss functions (see Rudebusch and
Svensson, 1999 and Levin and Williams, 2003, for example).
Optimal time-consistent monetary policy: We assume the central bank acts optimally under a
time-consistent policy or what is often called discretionary policy. Deﬁne W ( t,zt 1) as the value
function of the central bank’s optimal action at time t given state zt :=
 
ct 1,y 
t 1, H,t 1, F,t 1
 
and  t := (  
t,y 
t,r 
t,{ j,t}), for j = s,a,a ,H,F,q. Let the inﬁnite sequence of central bank
actions, {ut}
 
t=0 := {ct, H,t, F,t,qt,rt,st,yt}
 
t=0, deﬁne a central bank’s strategy starting from
the state vector at time t, xt. The private sector forms rational expectations of the future path of
these variables such that these expectations will be consistent with the equilibrium behavior as
approximated in (35)-(42).
Because the constraints (35)-(42) arising from the private sector’s recursive decentralized equilib-
rium response involve lagged endogenous variables, zt 1, which affects the value of a future central
bank, the discretion problem for a current central bank is still dynamic.
The sequence of discretionary problems can be written recursively as:
W ( t,zt 1) = min
ut
L( t,yt,qt,rt, r,t) +  EtW ( t+1,zt) (45)
subject to (35)-(42). The central bank takes private expectations as given when it sequentially
optimizes. We will restrict our attention to discretionary, time-consistent policy using the equilibrium
concept of Markov perfection. A Markov perfect strategy for the central bank is a sequence of state-
3In a linear-quadratic framework this will naturally show up as a linear perturbation to the reduced form optimal monetary
policy rule.
4 Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) showed that this is only possible in the case of complete pass through and under a restrictive
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contingent prices and allocations from which the central bank will not deviate, and these would also
be consistent with private sector equilibrium expectations.
We compute the optimal time-consistent policy (as a numerical ﬁxed-point problem in the product
space of central-bank-private-sector feasible actions) using the algorithm of Dennis (2004). In the
existing Bayesian literature on such models, one often estimates a reduced form Taylor type rule.
However, when the central bank optimizes under discretion, it can be shown, as in Dennis (2004),
that policy preference parameters and deep parameters place non-linear constraints on a reduced-form
policy feedback rule.
3. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
The ﬁrst question we would like to ask is the following: Do these ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting central
banks place much weight on exchange rate deviations? Existing papers have focused on whether and
how much central banks respond to exchange rates at the level of reduced form interest-rate rules (see
Lubik and Schorfheide, 2005b and Justiniano and Preston, 2005). The second question is whether
the preferences of the central banks are “different” or “similar”.
3.1 Estimation strategy
We proceed by estimating two versions of the model for each country. The ﬁrst version utilizes
the general one-period loss speciﬁcation in (44). We will call this larger model M1 in subsequent
discussions. The set of parameters to be estimated are the following central back preference pa-
rameters, {µy,µr,µq}, the private sector deep parameters, {h, , , , H, F, H, F} and the list of
parameters for exogenous processes {a1,b2,c3, a, q, s, H, F, a, q, s,   , y , r , r}.5
The second version, which we shall denote as model M2, uses (44) but restricting µq = 0. We
can then address the second question in (b) by using Bayesian posterior odds comparisons to see if
a model with or without µq = 0 is more probable, all other things equal.
We are interested in estimating the structural or deep parameters of our model and variations of
it. We classify a candidate model M by its list of parameters,  . Our estimation procedure uses
the random-walk-Metropolis Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. We outline this popular
algorithm in Appendix B. Table 1 summarizes the prior marginal density functions we use on each
estimated parameter in the models. We use fairly agnostic or dispersed prior densities as evident in
the wide 95% conﬁdence intervals around the prior means. To ensure that theoretical restrictions on
the parameter ranges are satisﬁed, we draw from prior densities that are restricted to the appropriate
supports. For example, we deﬁne a prior density for the Calvo parameter  H to have the domain
(0,1).
For each candidate  , the linear rational expectations (RE) system including the optimal monetary
policy problem is solved to obtain a general solution in terms of the endogenous state variables yt
and the central-bank policy decision variables, xt (which is just the scalar rt in our case):
 t+1 = A( ) t + C ( ) t+1 (46)
5There is very little information in the data to help us pin down the discount factor   and imports share in domestic
consumption,  , so we set these as 0.99 and 0.45, respectively.12 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
where  t := (yt,xt). We can map some of the variables in  t to a vector of observable variables, yo
t
using an observation equation:
yo
t = G t. (47)
We set the length of the parameters’ Markov chain to be N = 2 106 draws and remove the ﬁrst half
of the sample (the “burn-in” period) to remove any effect of the initial condition of the Markov chain
{ n} and also perform some diagnostic tests to check that our MCMC procedure has converged to
its stable, invariant distribution.
3.2 Data
Each model we consider has nine structural shocks. To avoid stochastic singularity, we match
these to nine observable time series for each of our sample countries: Australia, Canada and New
Zealand. We use quarterly data over the period 1990Q1 to 2005Q3. The time series data are from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics database, with the exception of Australian and New Zealand
CPI inﬂation series, which were obtained from the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand, respectively. The data we collect (with their corresponding theoretical counterparts
in parentheses) are import price inﬂation in home currency as a proxy for foreign goods inﬂation
( F,t := pF,t   pF,t 1), home-US real exchange rate (qt), the ‘terms of trade’ constructed as the
ratio of import prices to export prices (st := pF,t   pH,t), home real GDP (yt), home CPI inﬂation
( t), home nominal (overnight cash) interest rate (rt), the US CPI inﬂation rate from FRED (  
t),
US output (y 
t), and the US federal funds rate (r 
t).
We take an agnostic view of trends and cycles. We detrend using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter
and construct an output gap measured as deviations of output from this trend. We also ﬁlter the
terms of trade and real exchange rate data using the HP ﬁlter for similar reasons.
4. RESULTS
Before we turn to addressing our ﬁrst empirical question of whether the central banks in question
care explicitly about the exchange rate, we will discuss the estimates of parameters in the models
themselves and show that the estimates are quite plausible economically. In section 4.2 we take up
the ﬁrst main question. In section 4.3 we will address the second question of whether these central
banks are similar in their policy preferences.
4.1 Structural parameter estimates
The estimated prior and posterior density functions on the key structural model parameters for
Australia, Canada and New Zealand are displayed in ﬁgures 1-3. Mean estimates, standard deviations,
and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals for the posterior estimates are reported in tables 3-5.
In addition, the tables report summaries of diagnostic tests for convergence of the Markov chains
of the parameters. The convergence test statistics were computed by taking a subsequence of the
total 2 million draws, with a length of 0.5 million draws, to reduce computational burden. We sample
using the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm. The NSE in the ﬁfth column refers to the numeric standardKAM, LEES & LIU: HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS 13
error as an approximation to the true posterior standard error described in Geweke (1999). The p-
values in the sixth column refer to the equality test between the means calculated using the ﬁrst
and second half of the chain. In each of the models, there are only one or two parameters that did
not satisfy the equality test at the 5 percent level. None of the test statistics are signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level and there is no obvious pattern to which coefﬁcients fail the equality test.
The seventh column shows the univariate “shrink factors” using the ratio of between- and within-
chain variances as in Brooks and Gelman (1998). A shrink factor close to 1 is evidence of convergence
to a stationary distribution. Almost all of the shrink factors were less than 1.1 and the maximum
value across the six models is 1.26. The parameters with a shrink factor greater than 1.1 are those
parameters that did not satisfy 5 percent equality test. Overall, the evidence suggests that the Markov
chains have converged to their stationary distribution.
Australia: The posterior density estimates for the key parameters for Australia are displayed in
ﬁgure 1 for the case where the central bank is restricted to put no weight on exchange rate variability.
Fig. 1. Posterior distribution of key parameters: Australia. Prior (dashed) and Posterior (solid).
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The full set of model estimates is reported in tables 2 for model M1 and table 3 for model M2.
Our estimates of the Calvo-type frequency of price changes are    H   0.77 for M1 and    H   0.8 for
M2,and,    F   0.68 for M1 and    F   0.72 for M2, respectively, in the home goods and imported
goods sectors. This suggests that in the home goods sector, the average duration that prices remain
ﬁxed is between 4.3 to 5 quarters across the two models. Similarly, for the home goods sector,
average prices stay the same for 3 to 3.6 quarters on average. The “backward-lookingness” in the
Phillips curves, represnted by  H and  F, is quite low, especially, for the imported goods sector. The14 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
Fig. 2. Posterior distribution of key parameters: Canada. Prior (dashed) and Posterior (solid).
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high degrees of price stickiness imply that inﬂation is not very sensitive to changes in marginal cost
(or LOP gap) movements, and therefore, a smaller and slower transmission of monetary policy to
inﬂation.
In contrast, consumption is very sensitive to real-interest-rate changes because the estimate of  ,
the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, is quite close to 1. The degree of habit persistence is quite
high,   h   0.9. This has the opposite effect on the sensitivity of consumption to real-interest-rate
changes. The uniform within-sector demand elasticity of substitution estimate is       0.36 (M1) or
      0.17 (M2). This is lower than typical calibrations. For example, Monacelli (2005) sets     1.6.
A low   implies  H or domestic output gap is not very sensitive to terms of trade movements
compared to usual calibrations, all else equal. The inverse labour supply elasticity is       1.5.
Canada: The posterior density estimates for the key parameters for Canada are displayed in
ﬁgure 2. The full set of model estimates is reported in table 4 for model M1 and in table 5 for
model M2.
Notable exceptions for Canada’s results are that the degrees of backward-looking behavior in
ﬁrms’ pricing are much higher than the estimates for Australia. Here we have  H and  F estimated
in the order of 0.65 and 0.8 respectively.
New Zealand: The posterior density estimates for the key parameters for New Zealand are
displayed in ﬁgure 3 for the case where µq = 0. The full set of model estimates are reported in table
6 for model M1 and table 7 for model M2.
The private sector deep parameters in New Zealand are quite similarly to Australia with the notable
exception that the uniform within-sector demand elasticity of substitution estimate of       1 is muchKAM, LEES & LIU: HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS 15
higher than in Australia or Canada. This implies a greater elasticity of substitution of consumption
between home and foreign goods in the model. It also implies that New Zealand’s output gap will
be very responsive to terms of trade movements.
Fig. 3. Posterior distribution of key parameters: New Zealand. Prior (dashed) and Posterior (solid).
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4.2 Do central banks weight exchange rate volatility?
Our ﬁrst empirical question asks whether these ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting central banks care
about the real exchange rate explicitly. Consider two competing models of central banks for a
dataset y. Denote a ﬂexible inﬂation targeter with one-period payoff summarized by (44) as M1 :=
{      : 0 < µq    }. Let the alternative central bank that does not target exchange rate deviations
be given by M2 := {      : 0 = µq    }.
Table 8 summarizes our model comparison based on the posterior odds ratio or Bayes factor,
which in our case, is the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of the two competing models.6 For each of
the three countries, there is a “better ﬁt” of the data for model M2 than M1. For example, consider
Canada which has the lowest Bayes factor of 2.97   104 across the three economies. In order to
infer that the Bank of Canada explicitly targets exchange rate volatility (M1), one would need to
have a prior belief on M1 which is 2,970 times stronger than one’s prior belief on M2. Our result
in favour of M2 is corroborated by the observation that the posterior densities of µq, in the case of
model M1, estimated for all three countries is very tightly centered around a positive number close
to zero. Our result suggests that these small open economy inﬂation targeters do not explicitly target
exchange rates.
6The marginal likelihood of each model for a given data set is numerically computed using the modiﬁed harmonic mean
estimator in Geweke (1999).16 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
4.3 Central banks’ objectives and similarities
In this section we address the second empirical question of what are the features of these central
banks’ preferences and whether they are similar in a statistical sense. More precisely, we will be
looking at the “degree of overlap” between the marginal posterior distributions, and also the joint
posterior distributions, on their preference parameters.
Inspection of the results displayed in tables 3-8, reveals that the following features drive central
bank objectives in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. First, these central banks care a lot about
smoothing interest rate movements. Second, there is not a lot of weight placed on the output gap, a
result consistent with a strong inﬂation targeting focus for these central banks. Finally, these central
banks place virtually no weight on exchange rates.
Cross-country comparisons of the preference parameters reveal whether our three open economy
inﬂation targeters possess similar objectives. Figure 4 graphs the posterior distributions of both the
output stabilization parameter and the interest rate smoothing parameter for each country on the same
axes. The degree to which each country shares similar stabilization objectives is illustrated by the
degree of similarity between the posterior distributions. To measure the closeness of two distributions,
Fig. 4. Posterior comparison of loss function parameters






























DeJong, Ingram, and Whiteman (1996) construct a metric using the Conﬁdence Interval Criterion
(CIC). The CIC is:
CICij =
1




where Pj(si) is the distribution of the simulated model statistic and si, i = 1,··· ,n are the
distributions of interest where a =
 
2 and b = 1 a are particular quantiles of a reference distributionKAM, LEES & LIU: HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS 17
D(si) the tails of which are truncated by the parameter  . This implies that the CIC is in fact bounded
by 0 and (1    ) 1 (such that the CIC is only bounded between 0 and 1 for the special case when
  = 0). The CIC statistic can be thought of as measuring the overlap in two distributions.
A CIC statistic close to the upper bound (1    ) 1, implies the distributions are very similar. A
CIC close to zero implies the distributions are not particularly similar because either the location of
the distributions is different or the reference distribution is particularly diffuse.
DeJong, Ingram, and Whiteman (1996) advocate using the following measure as a test for differ-
ence in location of the distributions:
dji =




such that large difference in expected values (and hence expected location) generate large test statistics
while diffusion in the reference distribution D(Si) reduces the test statistic.
Inspecting ﬁgure 4, the output stabilization parameter in the top half of the ﬁgure shows that all
three countries place some weight on output stabilization. Canada appears to put the least weight
on output stabilization with the left-most posterior distribution with a posterior mode of 0.147.
The corresponding distribution for New Zealand is very similar in both shape and location, with a
posterior mode of 0.217. With   = 0.1 the CIC returns a value of 0.864, indicating that Canada and
New Zealand share a similar concern for output stabilization. The Australian posterior distribution
places a higher weight on output stabilization with a posterior mode of 0.384. The CIC between
Australia and Canada is much smaller – 0.186 although the CIC returns a statistic of 0.475 for the
overlap between output stabilization in Australia and New Zealand.
The graphic in the bottom half of ﬁgure 4 shows the overlap of the preference for interest rate
smoothing across the three countries. All three countries show some interest rate smoothing behavior.
Australia appears to place the least weight on smoothing the interest rate, returning a posterior model
of 0.493 while the corresponding parameter is 0.647 for Canada and 0.732 for the case of New
Zealand. However, the CIC statistics emphasize similarities rather than differences. The overlap in
preferences for smoothing interest rates is 0.830 between Australia and Canada, 0.829 for Australia
and New Zealand, and 1.0364 for Canada and New Zealand (which is greater than one since   = 0.1,
implying (1    ) 1   1.1).
A natural question is whether the overall macroeconomic objectives of each country are identical.
This is a joint test of whether the distribution of the preferences for macroeconomic stabilization and
interest rate smoothing are the same. Rather than averaging the CIC criterion across the preference
parameters, we construct a multivariate version of the CIC by generating a three dimensional
histogram of joint draws from the posterior. For convenience we set   = 0 and compare the volumes
generated by integrating over the preference parameters for each country. We use 500,000 draws
from the posterior and use a total of 625 bins to characterise the joint distribution.
This joint test returns a high degree of similarity across the distributions. Between Australia and
Canada, we ﬁnd that 90.6 percent of the draws can be characterised by the same distribution; and
this ﬁgure remains high between Australia and New Zealand (93.4 percent) and between Canada
and New Zealand (94.3 percent). Thus our results indicate that the preferences of these three small18 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
open economy inﬂation targeters are, in fact, pretty similar.
5. CONCLUSION
Estimating the macroeconomic policy objectives of the central banks of Australia, Canada and New
Zealand jointly within the context of an optimizing DSGE model, allow us to reveal the objectives
of these small open economy inﬂation targeters. We ﬁnd key differences in the structural parameters
of each economy that imply different behavior in the setting of monetary policy across countries –
even if these countries share identical monetary policy objectives.
We emphasize the similarities rather than the differences in the macroeconomic objectives of the
central banks of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Over the period considered, all three central
banks show no concern for mitigating exchange rate volatility as an objective in its own right. All
three central banks show a substantial concern for interest rate smoothing. The Reserve Bank of
Australia shows the most desire to mitigate volatility in the output gap but in all three cases the
estimated weight on the output gap is substantially lower than the weight on deviation of annual
inﬂation from target. However, all central banks would be sensibly classiﬁed as ﬂexible in their
approach to inﬂation targeting.
This has important implications for assessing the accountability and transparency of monetary
policy. By jointly estimating the parameter estimates conditional on the same DSGE model we
can make inferences about objectives conditional on the environment each central bank operates
under. This can result in very different conclusions relative to uninformed inference based on the
unconditional distributions of goal variables such as annual inﬂation, the output gap, interest rates and
the exchange rate. Future work could usefully extend the model to incorporate the potential effects
of labour market behavior, credit constraints and policymaking under uncertainty on the estimates
of central banks objectives.
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APPENDIX A
LOG-LINEAR APPROXIMATIONS TO FIRMS’ OPTIMAL PRICING RULE
A.1 Domestic goods pricing
Given our speciﬁc assumption on period utility of households, re-write the ﬁrst-order condition in (23),
using the s-period iterate on the Euler operator (10) to replace Qt,t+s, as
Et
   
s=0
(  H)



















Log-linearize this around the deterministic steady state to obtain
  pH,t    HpH,t 1
  (1     H)Et
   
s=0
(  H)
s [pH,t+s    HpH,t+s 1 + mcH,t+s +  H,t+s]
= (1     H)[pH,t    HpH,t 1 + mcH,t +  H,t]
+   H (1     H)Et
   
s=0
(  H)
s [pH,t+s+1    HpH,t+s + mcH,t+s+1 +  H,t+s+1].
This expression can be written recursively as
  pH,t    HpH,t 1   (1     H)[pH,t    HpH,t 1 + mcH,t +  H,t]
+   H [Et  pH,t+1    HpH,t 1]. (50)
Log-linearizing (19) yields
pH,t = (1    H)   pH,t +  HpH,t 1 +  H H H,t 1. (51)
Substituting (51) into (50) yields the expression (24).
Now, equating ﬁrms’ labor demand (22) to households labor supply (9):
MCH,t a,tPH,t
Pt




Log-linearizing this, and using the log-linearized production function yt = nt +  a,t, we have
mcH,t = pt   pH,t +
 
1   h
(ct   hct 1) +  yt   (1 +  ) a,t. (53)
Utilizing the log-linearized CPI index which implies pt   pH,t =   (pH,t   pF,t) =  st, and also (14), in
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Log-linearizing, and substituting with  F,t+s +  F,t+s = et+s + p 
t+s, we obtain
  pF,t    FpF,t 1   (1     F)Et
   
s=0
(  F)
s [pF,t+s +  F,t+s +  F,t+s    FpF,t+s 1].
Log-linearize (27) to get
pF,t = (1    F)   pF,t +  FpF,t 1 +  F F F,t 1. (54)
Making use of the last two expressions yields (31).
APPENDIX B
PSEUDO-CODE FOR MCMC PROCEDURE
ALGORITHM 1: The RW-metropolis algorithm for a linear RE model:
1) Begin with an initial prior  0     and its corresponding prior density p( 0|M) for model M.
2) Solve the linear RE model to obtain (46) and construct observation equation (47).
3) For each n = 0,1,...N, Use (46)-(47), the given data set y = {yo
t}
T
t=0, and  n to compute the
model likelihood, L( n|y,M) using a Kalman ﬁlter. Then calculate the associated posterior density,
p( n|y,M) =
p( n|M)L( n|y,M) R
  p( n|M)L( n|y,M)dµ( n).
4) Generate a new candidate draw using a random walk model:  n+1 =  n + zn+1, where we assume
zn+1   N (0,s ), and s > 0 is a scalar factor for scaling the size of the jump in the draws. Compute
the associated posterior density, p( n+1|y,M) by repeating Step 3, for  n+1.





. In words, if p( n+1|y,M) >
p( n|y,M), accept the new candidate  n+1 with probability 1. Otherwise, accept the new candidate
 n+1 with probability p( n+1|y,M)/p( n|y,M).
6) Repeat Steps 3-4 for N sufﬁciently large to ensure that the sequence { n}
N
n=0 is drawn from an ergodic
distribution,  .
7) Under some sufﬁcient conditions, we can apply the ergodic theorem of an irreducible Markov chain and
approximate the posterior expected value of a (bounded) function of interest, f ( ) using the sample
mean of the functions, N 1  N
n f ( n).KAM, LEES & LIU: HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS 23
APPENDIX C
PRIOR AND POSTERIOR PARAMETER ESTIMATES
TABLE 1
PRIOR PARAMETER DENSITIES FOR ALL MODELS.
Prior mean 2.5% 97.5% Domain Density function
h 0.60 0.19 0.93 (0,1) Beta
  1.00 0.27 2.19 R+ Gamma
  1.50 1.01 1.99 R+ Gamma
  1.00 0.27 2.19 R+ Gamma
 H 0.70 0.25 0.98 (0,1) Beta
 F 0.70 0.25 0.98 (0,1) Beta
 H 0.50 0.13 0.87 (0,1) Beta
 F 0.50 0.13 0.87 (0,1) Beta
a1 0.50 0.19 0.96 (0,1) Beta
b2 0.50 0.19 0.96 (0,1) Beta
c3 0.50 0.19 0.96 (0,1) Beta
 a 0.50 0.13 0.87 (0,1) Beta
 q 0.90 0.23 1.00 (0,1) Beta
 s 0.25 0.01 0.72 (0,1) Beta
µq 0.50 0.13 1.07 R+ Gamma
µy 0.50 0.09 1.24 R+ Gamma
µr 0.50 0.09 1.24 R+ Gamma
 H 2.66 0.91 7.32 R+ Inverse Gamma
 F 2.67 0.91 7.33 R+ Inverse Gamma
 a 1.19 0.52 2.66 R+ Inverse Gamma
 q 0.53 0.32 0.87 R+ Inverse Gamma
 s 1.19 0.52 2.66 R+ Inverse Gamma
    1.19 0.52 2.66 R+ Inverse Gamma
 y  1.19 0.52 2.66 R+ Inverse Gamma
 r  1.19 0.52 2.66 R+ Inverse Gamma
 r 1.19 0.52 2.66 R+ Inverse Gamma
For µq = 0 the prior and posterior distributions will be degenerate at zero.24 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
TABLE 2
POSTERIOR PARAMETERS AND CONVERGENCE DIAGNOSTICS: AUSTRALIA (µq  = 0).
Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
  0.990 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.000 1.000 1.000
  0.450 0.000 0.450 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000
h 0.917 0.022 0.871 0.953 0.002 0.234 1.029
  0.809 0.259 0.395 1.440 0.045 0.464 1.026
  1.586 0.245 1.111 2.059 0.011 0.993 1.000
  0.363 0.101 0.210 0.594 0.012 0.351 1.021
 H 0.257 0.101 0.096 0.504 0.013 0.353 1.023
 F 0.046 0.027 0.010 0.109 0.001 0.651 1.001
 H 0.777 0.026 0.726 0.829 0.003 0.666 1.004
 F 0.682 0.036 0.612 0.754 0.004 0.951 1.000
a1 0.259 0.084 0.113 0.439 0.002 0.041 1.003
b2 0.719 0.061 0.583 0.822 0.003 0.955 1.000
c3 0.891 0.059 0.770 1.005 0.001 0.258 1.001
 a 0.809 0.035 0.735 0.870 0.002 0.657 1.001
 q 0.684 0.050 0.576 0.773 0.004 0.832 1.000
 s 0.811 0.049 0.696 0.893 0.004 0.830 1.001
µq 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.729 1.001
µy 0.412 0.156 0.165 0.766 0.021 0.759 1.003
µr 0.611 0.186 0.307 0.988 0.028 0.198 1.062
 H 1.057 0.317 0.565 1.827 0.031 0.576 1.005
 F 4.430 1.629 1.393 7.121 0.288 0.517 1.021
 a 5.178 1.021 3.395 7.325 0.162 0.154 1.079
 q 0.746 0.123 0.542 1.023 0.009 0.736 1.001
 s 5.452 0.543 4.494 6.515 0.061 0.061 1.066
    0.418 0.043 0.341 0.509 0.001 0.435 1.000
 y  0.547 0.071 0.421 0.701 0.002 0.888 1.000
 r  0.220 0.021 0.182 0.265 0.000 0.954 1.000
 r 0.363 0.051 0.273 0.471 0.002 0.111 1.004
Notes:
a. The numerical standard error (NSE) as given in Geweke (1999).
b. The p-value is computed using L = 0.08 in Geweke (1999).
c. The B-G univariate “shrink factor” as in Brooks and Gelman (1998).KAM, LEES & LIU: HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS 25
TABLE 3
POSTERIOR PARAMETERS AND CONVERGENCE DIAGNOSTICS: AUSTRALIA (µq = 0).
Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
  0.990 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.000 1.000 1.000
  0.450 0.000 0.450 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000
h 0.925 0.022 0.876 0.963 0.003 0.899 1.000
  1.029 0.241 0.661 1.646 0.036 0.014 1.244
  1.492 0.261 0.968 1.995 0.016 0.172 1.011
  0.219 0.097 0.079 0.430 0.014 0.008 1.231
 H 0.399 0.162 0.142 0.717 0.021 0.000 1.382
 F 0.047 0.025 0.010 0.108 0.001 0.436 1.002
 H 0.797 0.026 0.743 0.845 0.003 0.824 1.001
 F 0.720 0.035 0.649 0.785 0.005 0.701 1.004
a1 0.257 0.084 0.110 0.433 0.002 0.984 1.000
b2 0.750 0.063 0.617 0.861 0.005 0.144 1.022
c3 0.891 0.060 0.772 1.007 0.001 0.621 1.000
 a 0.728 0.101 0.465 0.847 0.013 0.019 1.197
 q 0.703 0.049 0.602 0.796 0.004 0.719 1.001
 s 0.852 0.048 0.737 0.927 0.006 0.870 1.001
µy 0.404 0.354 0.202 1.482 0.021 0.000 1.697
µr 0.517 0.153 0.265 0.845 0.022 0.287 1.035
 H 2.058 0.994 0.728 4.223 0.167 0.137 1.098
 F 1.504 1.290 0.355 5.405 0.168 0.227 1.063
 a 6.758 1.105 4.692 8.891 0.167 0.006 1.280
 q 0.819 0.121 0.602 1.069 0.009 0.130 1.022
 s 5.716 0.661 4.388 7.167 0.086 0.013 1.162
    0.419 0.043 0.341 0.509 0.001 0.651 1.000
 y  0.533 0.071 0.410 0.686 0.002 0.411 1.001
 r  0.219 0.021 0.182 0.265 0.000 0.866 1.000
 r 0.342 0.042 0.267 0.430 0.001 0.986 1.000
Notes:
a. The numerical standard error (NSE) as given in Geweke (1999).
b. The p-value is computed using L = 0.08 in Geweke (1999).
c. The B-G univariate “shrink factor” as in Brooks and Gelman (1998).26 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
TABLE 4
POSTERIOR PARAMETERS AND CONVERGENCE DIAGNOSTICS: CANADA (µq  = 0).
Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
  0.990 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.000 1.000 1.000
  0.450 0.000 0.450 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000
h 0.912 0.030 0.850 0.966 0.003 0.415 1.010
  1.241 0.354 0.557 1.875 0.061 0.409 1.032
  1.477 0.248 1.009 1.976 0.006 0.057 1.004
  0.416 0.119 0.206 0.668 0.010 0.443 1.009
 H 0.644 0.179 0.227 0.937 0.024 0.221 1.050
 F 0.776 0.145 0.423 0.977 0.020 0.546 1.012
 H 0.933 0.017 0.901 0.966 0.002 0.099 1.060
 F 0.849 0.031 0.785 0.907 0.002 0.407 1.006
a1 0.266 0.084 0.119 0.442 0.002 0.976 1.000
b2 0.748 0.064 0.611 0.865 0.003 0.706 1.000
c3 0.893 0.061 0.770 1.009 0.001 0.566 1.000
 a 0.433 0.151 0.144 0.723 0.022 0.522 1.013
 q 0.704 0.048 0.607 0.795 0.004 0.852 1.000
 s 0.229 0.167 0.011 0.607 0.024 0.122 1.077
µq 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.511 1.002
µy 0.157 0.094 0.033 0.409 0.012 0.891 1.000
µr 0.855 0.424 0.186 1.779 0.068 0.014 1.266
 H 20.646 1.569 18.025 24.428 0.243 0.270 1.053
 F 0.752 0.411 0.287 1.869 0.036 0.431 1.008
 a 2.121 1.004 0.584 4.539 0.144 0.590 1.009
 q 0.841 0.111 0.640 1.077 0.008 0.659 1.001
 s 2.271 0.369 1.584 3.014 0.035 0.296 1.017
    0.367 0.040 0.296 0.452 0.000 0.964 1.000
 y  0.533 0.071 0.406 0.687 0.002 0.651 1.000
 r  0.222 0.022 0.183 0.269 0.000 0.102 1.000
 r 0.360 0.045 0.281 0.457 0.001 0.726 1.000
Notes:
a. The numerical standard error (NSE) as given in Geweke (1999).
b. The p-value is computed using L = 0.08 in Geweke (1999).
c. The B-G univariate “shrink factor” as in Brooks and Gelman (1998).KAM, LEES & LIU: HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS 27
TABLE 5
POSTERIOR PARAMETERS AND CONVERGENCE DIAGNOSTICS: CANADA (µq = 0).
Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
  0.990 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.000 1.000 1.000
  0.450 0.000 0.450 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000
h 0.906 0.030 0.851 0.964 0.003 0.290 1.015
  1.285 0.338 0.578 1.875 0.055 0.175 1.075
  1.456 0.254 0.961 1.952 0.006 0.036 1.004
  0.476 0.114 0.268 0.704 0.009 0.812 1.001
 H 0.657 0.177 0.237 0.929 0.023 0.129 1.084
 F 0.873 0.082 0.684 0.989 0.007 0.146 1.026
 H 0.922 0.016 0.891 0.952 0.001 0.367 1.009
 F 0.852 0.037 0.760 0.905 0.003 0.039 1.088
a1 0.265 0.084 0.119 0.443 0.001 0.670 1.000
b2 0.718 0.066 0.578 0.840 0.003 0.552 1.001
c3 0.897 0.059 0.775 1.011 0.001 0.897 1.000
 a 0.366 0.137 0.120 0.639 0.016 0.530 1.009
 q 0.731 0.044 0.640 0.812 0.003 0.720 1.001
 s 0.257 0.180 0.012 0.658 0.025 0.583 1.009
µy 0.147 0.069 0.049 0.313 0.006 0.941 1.000
µr 0.672 0.233 0.248 1.106 0.033 0.061 1.110
 H 20.462 3.145 13.842 24.834 0.545 0.214 1.081
 F 0.682 0.490 0.277 2.347 0.033 0.197 1.036
 a 2.397 1.618 0.774 6.779 0.221 0.169 1.085
 q 0.780 0.104 0.600 1.004 0.004 0.568 1.001
 s 2.154 0.362 1.448 2.856 0.039 0.712 1.002
    0.368 0.040 0.297 0.453 0.000 0.755 1.000
 y  0.546 0.073 0.419 0.704 0.001 0.073 1.002
 r  0.220 0.021 0.183 0.266 0.000 0.409 1.000
 r 0.315 0.035 0.252 0.389 0.001 0.787 1.000
Notes:
a. The numerical standard error (NSE) as given in Geweke (1999).
b. The p-value is computed using L = 0.08 in Geweke (1999).
c. The B-G univariate “shrink factor” as in Brooks and Gelman (1998).28 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 473
TABLE 6
POSTERIOR PARAMETERS AND CONVERGENCE DIAGNOSTICS: NEW ZEALAND (µq  = 0).
Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
  0.990 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.000 1.000 1.000
  0.450 0.000 0.450 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000
h 0.785 0.040 0.729 0.896 0.004 0.195 1.060
  1.568 0.396 0.822 2.257 0.070 0.186 1.085
  1.550 0.247 1.053 2.028 0.013 0.654 1.001
  1.011 0.329 0.421 1.683 0.041 0.805 1.001
 H 0.175 0.074 0.055 0.338 0.006 0.761 1.001
 F 0.087 0.045 0.020 0.193 0.003 0.483 1.003
 H 0.775 0.029 0.711 0.825 0.004 0.786 1.002
 F 0.697 0.021 0.649 0.729 0.002 0.004 1.171
a1 0.237 0.085 0.100 0.422 0.002 0.104 1.004
b2 0.698 0.050 0.587 0.791 0.004 0.310 1.013
c3 0.890 0.060 0.770 1.007 0.001 0.187 1.001
 a 0.544 0.187 0.165 0.830 0.031 0.625 1.011
 q 0.695 0.039 0.596 0.760 0.004 0.576 1.006
 s 0.682 0.068 0.547 0.827 0.006 0.952 1.000
µq 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.018 0.000 0.965 1.000
µy 0.273 0.138 0.100 0.623 0.020 0.574 1.010
µr 0.850 0.252 0.312 1.221 0.034 0.007 1.287
 H 2.100 1.298 0.579 4.984 0.230 0.984 1.000
 F 0.775 0.362 0.307 1.647 0.031 0.032 1.064
 a 20.023 1.870 15.376 22.747 0.277 0.003 1.368
 q 0.800 0.135 0.590 1.122 0.015 0.723 1.003
 s 2.656 0.471 1.858 3.689 0.045 0.093 1.056
    0.412 0.043 0.335 0.503 0.000 0.924 1.000
 y  0.553 0.073 0.423 0.708 0.002 0.177 1.003
 r  0.222 0.022 0.184 0.269 0.000 0.049 1.001
 r 0.374 0.059 0.268 0.500 0.003 0.486 1.004
Notes:
a. The numerical standard error (NSE) as given in Geweke (1999).
b. The p-value is computed using L = 0.08 in Geweke (1999).
c. The B-G univariate “shrink factor” as in Brooks and Gelman (1998).KAM, LEES & LIU: HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS 29
TABLE 7
POSTERIOR PARAMETERS AND CONVERGENCE DIAGNOSTICS: NEW ZEALAND (µq = 0).
Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
  0.990 0.000 0.990 0.990 0.000 1.000 1.000
  0.450 0.000 0.450 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000
h 0.812 0.036 0.752 0.891 0.005 0.999 1.000
  1.312 0.318 0.674 2.015 0.046 0.236 1.062
  1.586 0.264 1.041 2.082 0.010 0.149 1.011
  0.917 0.307 0.369 1.553 0.031 0.617 1.005
 H 0.173 0.074 0.043 0.324 0.007 0.275 1.019
 F 0.083 0.044 0.019 0.190 0.002 0.390 1.004
 H 0.767 0.027 0.712 0.819 0.003 0.073 1.074
 F 0.683 0.020 0.645 0.725 0.002 0.017 1.095
a1 0.240 0.079 0.103 0.408 0.002 0.501 1.000
b2 0.722 0.048 0.612 0.809 0.004 0.414 1.007
c3 0.891 0.060 0.769 1.006 0.001 0.274 1.000
 a 0.622 0.209 0.101 0.821 0.024 0.005 1.296
 q 0.708 0.035 0.631 0.769 0.003 0.199 1.017
 s 0.717 0.057 0.606 0.830 0.006 0.695 1.003
µy 0.217 0.113 0.091 0.534 0.013 0.573 1.006
µr 0.732 0.222 0.394 1.322 0.030 0.232 1.058
 H 1.325 1.558 0.629 6.497 0.089 0.004 1.348
 F 0.909 0.478 0.319 2.141 0.051 0.394 1.012
 a 17.959 1.596 15.579 21.365 0.246 0.044 1.164
 q 0.794 0.128 0.587 1.097 0.009 0.544 1.003
 s 2.633 0.454 1.738 3.530 0.041 0.003 1.114
    0.412 0.042 0.336 0.501 0.000 0.492 1.000
 y  0.546 0.072 0.417 0.702 0.002 0.368 1.001
 r  0.222 0.022 0.184 0.269 0.000 0.967 1.000
 r 0.338 0.047 0.255 0.441 0.003 0.080 1.018
Notes:
a. The numerical standard error (NSE) as given in Geweke (1999).
b. The p-value is computed using L = 0.08 in Geweke (1999).
c. The B-G univariate “shrink factor” as in Brooks and Gelman (1998).
TABLE 8
POSTERIOR ODDS MODEL COMPARISON.
Country (Model, Mi) p(y|Mi) ln
p(y|M1)
p(y|M2) Bayes factor
Australia (i = 1) -1955.0
Australia (i = 2) -1941.7 -13.3 5.97   105
Canada (i = 1) -1815.6
Canada (i = 2) -1805.3 -10.3 2.97   104
New Zealand (i = 1) -1994.6
New Zealand (i = 2) -1980.5 -14.1 1.33   106
Notes:
a. M1 : µq > 0 and M2 : µq = 0.
b. Marginal likelihood for Geweke’s p = 0.1 are reported, where p   (0,1).
c. The Bayes factor is calculated as
p(y|M2)
p(y|M1).NOT FOR PUBLICATION: REFEREE COPY i
UNCOVERING THE HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS: A
BAYESIAN STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
BY TIMOTHY KAM, KIRDAN LEES AND PHILIP LIU
ABSTRACT. In this technical appendix, we provide some notes on the theoretical basis of the MCMC
algorithm which we employed in the paper. We consider only the discrete parameter state space
here for both simplicity and also for the fact that the parameter state space as approximated on the
computer in applications is discrete.
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1. COMPUTATION OF BAYESIAN POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
Each model can be thought of as summarized by the set of parameters,       where     Rk. In
reality, on a computer,   is a countable and ﬁnite set. Given a model, M, deﬁned by its parameters
 , we can compute the likelihood of the data being generated by this model as L(y| ,M). By using
a Bayesian perspective, we weight this likelihood with our own prior beliefs about where the model
should “locate”, using a prior density on the parameters p( ). By Bayes’ rule, we have the posterior





Since the Bayesian take the data as ﬁxed, we can express this as
p( |y)   L( |y,M)p( ) (2)
We compute the posterior density, p( |y), using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.
1.1 Existence and stability of an invariant posterior distribution
There is a connection between the existence and uniqueness of a posterior distribution for   and
stability of a sequence of candidate  ’s constructed as a Markov Chain. This also implies that the
idea of using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to compute the posterior density is a
theoretically good one. The following discussion and analysis follows Norris (1997) closely. For a
more practical “cookbook” approach, see Koop (2003).
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We want to work with the approximation to p( |y) using the invariant distribution of a sequence
{ n}n 0 constructed as a Markov chain. In practice, a parameter region located at site m,  m, as
represented on the computer is ﬁnite. We will thus be analyzing the algorithm in a MCMC state





where we also assume that   is ﬁnite. We can think of the set of candidate parameters, X :=
{ (m) : m    } as a random variable, where X   I, and for every site m    ,  (m)    m.
We want an approximate distribution to the distribution constructed from the unobserved posterior
density p( |y). Deﬁne the unknown distribution as   = { i : i   I}, so that we can compute sample
moments of interest from this approximate distribution as:
 
i I
 if ( (i)) (3)
However, the problem is that typically,   is a very large set, so then the product space I will be
very large! In such cases, computing the sum (3) above, site by site, becomes infeasible. A sampling
approach would be to simulate a long sequence of random variables,  1,..., N, that would live in
the state space I, where each sequence has distribution  , so then we can approximate (3) with the
sample counterpart, N 1  N





f ( n)  
 
i I
 if ( (i))
with probability 1. Even, then sampling from the distribution   can also be difﬁcult when   does
not have product form: Norris (1997).
We can exploit sampling using a MCMC approach. The idea is to simulate a Markov chain { n}n 1
which by construction would have an invariant distribution  . This is much easier than simulating
the whole distribution   since the state space for the Markov chain is the product space I. That is,
the chain X := { n}n 1 evolves by changing its components one site m at a time. When a site m
is chosen, we simulate a new random vector  n+1 (m)    m. Thus at each stage of the chain, we
only simulate one component of X at a time in the smaller space  m rather than the whole state
space I. By doing so, we can construct, step by step, the whole random variable X with distribution
 .
Following Norris (1997) we deﬁne i
m   j if i and j agree, except possibly at site m. We require
that a new value  n+1 (m) to be generated at site m follow the law described by a stochastic matrix
P (m) where pij (m) = 0 unless i
m   j. Thus, for every site m, there is a P (m), and thus, a family
of such transitional probability matrices can be constructed, one P (m) for each site m.
A sufﬁcient condition for   to be an invariant distribution for P (m) is to have, for all i,j   I,
 ipij (m) =  jpji (m)NOT FOR PUBLICATION: TECHNICAL APPENDIX iii
These are known as detailed balance equations. (See Lemma 1.9.2 in Norris (1997).)
For any candidate stochastic matrix R(m) with elements rij (m) = 0 unless i
m   j, we can uncover
P (m) by:
 ipij (m) =  irij (m)    jrji (m), i  = j
and then
pii (m) = 1  
 
j =i
pij (m)   0.
The interpretation of the above law is as follows, which is known as a Hastings algorithm. If




˜  n+1 with probability ( jrji (m)/ irij (m))   1
 n otherwise
A special case takes rij (m) = rji (m) for all i and j and deﬁnes P (m) by
pij (m) = (( j/ i)   1)rij (m)
for i
m   j and i  = j. This is called the Metropolis algorithm. The idea is to pick a random value
 n+1 =  (jm) at site m. If the posterior probability associated with the value  (jm) is greater
than the posterior probability associated with  (i),  j >  i, the chain is instructed to move to the
new value,  n+1 =  (jm) with probability 1, otherwise, we adopt the new value with probability
 j/ i < 1 (i.e. we reject the new value with probability 1    j/ i and set  n+1 =  n).
One example, which we use, is the random walk Metropolis algorithm, where:
 n+1 =  n + zn+1;z    ; (4)
where we assumed   to be a jointly normal density, N(0,Vk). Further, the posterior probabilities,
 i, j are computed using the Bayes rule (2) which will be dependent on the model ( n,M|y). As
in the Bayesian econometrics literature, we deﬁne the acceptance ratio as




Since { n}n 0 visits a site randomly at each stage in the random walk Metropolis algorithm,
{ n}n 0 is itself Markov-(P, ), where the stochastic matrix is given as
P = | | 1  
m  
P (m).
and   is the initial distribution of the chain.
By construction, P will be irreducible. We also know that
 ipij (m) =  jpji (m), m, i,jiv NOT FOR PUBLICATION: REFEREE COPY
and it follows that
 ipij =  jpji, i,j.
So   is the unique invariant measure for P. Thus, by the ergodicity theorem (see e.g. Theorem







f ( n)  
 
i I
 if ( (i)),n   + 
 
= 1.
where f : I   R is a bounded function.
In summary, by simulating a long enough Markov chain in the parameter state space I, we can
approximate the moments of the posterior distribution   of these parameters with the distribution of
the random variable X := { n}n 0 generated by the MCMC algorithm.
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